A Carnivore’s Shame
Bearing in mind the recent seasonal gorging, here’s another Classic Sentence from the Guardian. This time courtesy of Neel Mukherjee and his deep ruminations on vegetarianism.
It slowly dawned on me that there were no rational, intellectual or moral arguments to be made for carnivorousness.
Heavens, he’s bold. There simply isn’t a good reason to partake of the flesh. None whatsoever. I do hope there’s a devastating argument to support such a claim.
The meat-eaters had always already lost. This is not the place to rehearse all those arguments.
Ah. Not the place. Isn’t it wonderful when arguments can be won entirely in your own head, with none of that messy business with evidence, logic and stuff you hadn’t thought of? Mr Mukherjee does, however, indulge us with one attempt at reasoning:
Far more convincing for me than all kinds of shocking exposés of the meat industry and the way a piece of steak makes it way on to our plates… was the unimpeachable moral argument against speciesism: because we are the most powerful animals in the animal kingdom, because all animals are at our mercy and we can choose to do whatever we want with them, it is our moral duty not to decimate, factory farm and eat them. It is an argument of such majesty and generosity that its force is almost emotional.
Note the invention of an entirely new prejudice for those so inclined to feel guilty about – speciesism. Note too the sly conflation of meat eating with factory farming and decimation. This “unimpeachable moral argument” could of course be expressed a little less tendentiously,
Because we can eat animals it’s our duty not to.
But then – amazingly – it loses much of its persuasive force. To say nothing of its majesty.
Yes, it’s easy to mock, but I suspect there’s a serious purpose to outpourings of this kind. It just isn’t the one being affected by the writer and much of his readership. Clearly, the object isn’t to test the moral premise of vegetarianism:
This is not the place to rehearse all those arguments.
Indeed. This is a place for something else – something that for many Guardianistas is much more important. It’s a chance to signal attitudes that are ostentatious, self-involved and most likely dishonest: “Watch me agonise over meat. Look at how concerned I am. See how I fret.” The point is to display The Passion of Neel Mukherjee as he wrestles with temptation:
I still haven’t been able to stop eating meat. In any restaurant, my eyes alight first, as if by an atavistic pull, on the meat dishes on the menu. In any dinner party I throw, I think of the non-vegetarian dish as central. I view this as a combination of weakness, greed and moral failure. Someone please help.
Again, note the key ingredients – gratuitous personal drama and pretentious guilt. This posturing nonsense is pretty much a Guardian staple. Readers may recall Cath Elliott being politically distressed by peanut butter residue, and note the similarities between her dietary drama and that of Mr Mukherjee. Perhaps such things are best understood as a kind of theatre for people who wish to agonise and be seen agonising, so as to indicate just how concerned and moral they are, if only to people who are equally conflicted and pretentious.
Well, the good news is that when one spends his/her time morally vexed about whether one’s chicken marsala had feelings, one doesn’t have to be troubled about other, less important things, like, oh say, Iranian atomic bombs or compulsory female genital mutilation.
BTW, is it just me, or did this Mukherjee just attend the “tautology” lecture in his Logic & Rhetoric class and skip the rest of the semester.
Regards.
“In any restaurant, my eyes alight first, as if by an atavistic pull, on the meat dishes on the menu… I view this as a combination of weakness, greed and moral failure. Someone please help.”
Heh. Maybe he can’t stop eating meat because he likes the guilt so much.
So this guy thinks there are “no rational, intellectual or moral arguments” for eating meat AND he’s convinced by the “unimpeachable moral argument against speciesism”… and he STILL eats meat? How rational is he?
He’s not even a born-again vegetarian. He’s a WOULD BE born again vegetarian.
“He’s not even a born-again vegetarian. He’s a WOULD BE born again vegetarian.”
Quite. Though in fairness to Mr Mukherjee, he makes such a poor case for his own professed moral position it’s hardly surprising he fails to live up to it.
These are the days of Ashura, and flogging oneself publicly is clearly traditional.
Personally, I see a religious argument for eating meat. Animals would not taste so good if our creator would not want us to consume them.
-S
“It slowly dawned on me that there were no rational, intellectual or moral arguments to be made for carnivorousness.”
Protein, efficient consumption of.
“an argument of such majesty and generosity that its force is almost emotional”.
This is an almost perfect phrase. If only Neal had had the courage of his convictions and identified it as *entirely* emotional, he would have hit the bullseye, not shaved it.
And if only I had spelt his name correctly. My bad, Neel.
Simen has it right
If God didn’t want us to eat e.g. pigs, why did he make them out of wonderful bacon butties? Answer me that then would-be veggie!
What’s amusing is how readily Mr Mukherjee dismisses the endless possible counterarguments and concentrates instead on frivolous self-chastisement and calls for intervention: “In any dinner party I throw, I think of the non-vegetarian dish as central. I view this as a combination of weakness, greed and moral failure. Someone please help.”
Maybe he should just present his rear for spanking and have done with it.
“Because we can eat animals it’s our duty not to”
to which one can retort “Because we can breathe, it’s our duty not to.” You first Mr Mukherjee.
Oh dear. Double quarter-pounder with bacon and extra cheese for lunch again it seems. And possibly veal for dinner.
Virtually all of these anti-meat eating screeds at some point employ the “if you knew how your meat got on your plate you wouldn’t eat it” argument. It’s a supremely stupid argument that’s both insulting and unable to stand up to even a superficial comparison to the facts. Of course I know where the steak I’m eating came from. A child can identify what beast the particular cut of meat she’s devouring came from. More importantly farmers represent a large sample of individuals who both had to raise and slaughter their own meat. Percentage of farmers who were vegetarian through out history? Fairly close to zero I’d imagine. Farmers who had the means to raise and consume meat did almost without exception. Some how this group which comprised the bulk of humanity for the the majority of recorded history managed to over come their revulsion of having to slaughter animals to consume meat.
But they didn’t have the opportunity to display their finely honed sensitivities to a fawning Guardian audience.
A lot of people seem to need religion. Discarding the old religions leaves a needful void. Hence, faith-based reasoning on matters of public policy, and new definitions of kosher.
“I view this as a combination of weakness, greed and moral failure.”
So preferring steak over soya is “greed” now?
Well there are fairly conclusive arguments to show that “speciesism” (and, as a corollary, eating meat, for affluent people) are morally wrong, but it doesn’t seem Mr. Mukherjee knows them.
“It slowly dawned on me that there were no rational, intellectual or moral arguments to be made for carnivorousness.”
From the evolutionary point of view, we wouldn’t be humans with all our skills and intelligence if we weren’t hunters and meateaters. These vegans really take the cake in bringing us back into darkness.
I mean, PoMos would bring us back into medieval way of obscurantist thinking, newagers into pagan religions, but vegans want us to be stupid as cattle.
Ed,
“Well there are fairly conclusive arguments to show that ‘speciesism’ (and, as a corollary, eating meat, for affluent people) are morally wrong…”
There are? Feel free to share them.
Hey David,
A well-constructed argument from marginal cases should suffice. I’ve written a small paper with my own little riff on it. I’m happy to send it you, if you’d like?
By all means.
David,
Sent. I hope you can show me I’m wrong as there’s a Chrismas ham downstairs and I so need to be all over that motherfucker.
No, we eat animals because we need the protein and because (some of them anyway) taste pretty good. But also because a grazing animal dying naturally of disease, starvation or consumption by another wild animal dies a protracted death. By contrast, death of the said animal in a modern abbatoir is humane.
Not to end an animal’s life this way is to allow needless suffering.
It was with great trepidation that I trawled through the academic literature during my philosophy masters. Unfortunately I could find no way out and was forced to abandon those tasty practices. From my experience, a significant proportion of analytic philosophy postgraduates and professionals are vegetarians because of those arguments.
I’m with Ed on this one. I’ve been looking for a way out of the marginal cases argument for a long while.
And the arguments are?
Simplius,
I’ve written a small paper with my own little riff on it. I’m happy to send it you, if you’d like?
Why not here? It isn’t something like Monthy Python’s funniest joke in the world,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gpjk_MaCGM , isn’t it?
He’s so brave. Sigh.
Perhaps he can wander out into the jungles and explain to the tiger about it’s carnivorous shame…
I can’t see any moral argument ever being “conclusive” or stopping our species from eating meat. The veggies I know stopped because of things like factory farming not because they think eating animals is morally wrong.
Karen,
“I can’t see any moral argument ever being ‘conclusive’ or stopping our species from eating meat.”
Well, setting aside appeals to sentiment and digestive disgust, you’re basically left with arguments in the abstract. The problem with this academic approach is precisely that it’s abstracted from real world practicality and imperatives, which tends to undermine any claim of moral weight. (Formal abstract arguments tend to presuppose that morality ought to coincide with formal logic, especially logic stripped of realistic detail.) It’s rather like saying, “no-one should starve while others eat pie,” or “in a world without money, people should do X instead of Y.”
It’s hard to imagine broad agreement even on basic terms and propositions, let alone any ascetic conclusions derived from them. I’m sure “meat ethics” can be an interesting academic pastime, but for most of the world that’s all it is and all it’s likely to remain. It’s a rarefied local intrigue. Imagine the prospect of trying to legally enforce some “anti-speciesist” sentiment or global “meat morality.” The implications are either monstrous or comical.
Sigh. David frequently calls our attention to artists engaged in fatuous shenanigans made possible by taxpayer support, and as an artist, it makes me feel apologetic about the vocation. As a vegetarian, please allow me to disown Mr. Mukherjee likewise. From the beginnings of my vegetarianism twenty years ago, it has always been my policy that whatever are the evils of eating meat, they are much lesser than the evils of being an ungracious guest in someone’s home, acting like a prig at the dinner table, or making ostentatious displays of one’s ostensibly superior moral position like Mukherjee, a position in this case not even earned by actual vegetarianism.
My rationale for being a vegetarian is mostly emotional. I’m a mammal, I have mammals as pets, and I don’t like the idea of eating mammals. My feelings about the matter taper as we go down the evolutionary chain, although everything seems to want to live as far as I can tell. I once visited a dam in Oregon and saw salmon struggling up the fish ladder, and the sight made me forswear eating fish for a long while. But it would be idiotic to suggest that because I have these feelings, you should have them too. Rather, it stands to reason that because the continuation of life requires the discontinuation of other lives, one ought to approach the table with a measure of humility and wonder. More than that I won’t assert.
“But it would be idiotic to suggest that because I have these feelings, you should have them too. Rather, it stands to reason that because the continuation of life requires the discontinuation of other lives, one ought to approach the table with a measure of humility and wonder. More than that I won’t assert.”
Well said.
David and Karen: Would arguments against slavery and racism count as conclusive moral arguments?
“I can’t see any moral argument ever being “conclusive” or stopping our species from eating meat. The veggies I know stopped because of things like factory farming not because they think eating animals is morally wrong.”
Karen,
Again, I’m happy to send you mine.
David,
Well, if you think I’m guilty of those things, then it would be great if you could cite some specific examples of things you don’t agree with, think are insufficiently meaningful or think are just plain wrong and explain what you mean as clearly as possible. (Also, I’m painfully aware that this issue can be a little crusty and unfashionable. Nor do I want world Quorn domination!)
Jim,
I suspect arguments against slavery and racism would entail less abstraction and thus be more compelling and more broadly conceded.
Franklin,
Quite. I’ve no great interest in whether (or why) someone chooses to do without meat. Unless they’re coming for dinner, it’s none of my business. It’s Mukherjee’s public pantomime that warranted comment. In a way, his position is actually quite ingenious. He wants the lofty moral adamance of The Righteous and Judgemental Vegetarian while failing to meet the most basic requirement of the role. He even manages to turn his continued meat consumption into a kind of heroic Passion Play, whereby he can invite sympathy for his “weakness, greed and moral failure” – all while maintaining a superior attitude. And he found a mainstream newspaper in which such humbug would be welcomed.
Hell, I’m almost impressed.
Ed,
I don’t recall suggesting you were “guilty” of anything. I wasn’t referring directly to any details of your own paper, which you said wasn’t intended for public consumption. (And I’m not about to parse it on demand without a fee.) It’s simply that the academic approach is typically somewhat technical and idealised and thus unlikely to have a large sociological effect. As tools to inhibit such a basic human function, academic papers – whatever their merit – aren’t the thing to count on for a decisive outcome – i.e. a shift in mass behaviour. As opposed to, say, health concerns or personal disgust, which strike me as more effective.
David,
So arguments against slavery and racism do, in your opinion, count as conclusive moral arguments?
Could you please give me some specific examples of differences of abstraction between these arguments.
Many people are veggies for non-moral or non-rational reasons – which is fine – it just clouds the issue when they get involved with debates on the moral arguments for it. Whether such arguments are sound stands apart from whether people are motivated by them.
David: How about posting Ed’s essay about the morality of meat-eating. I think many of us would love to get a crack at it.
Jim,
“So arguments against slavery and racism do, in your opinion, count as conclusive moral arguments?”
It’s possible we’re talking at cross purposes. Slavery and racism strike me as objectionable – and instinctively so – but I don’t recall a point at which “conclusive” moral arguments were presented to me and accepted. I don’t think that’s how moral understandings – and changes in understandings – are most often arrived at.
To return to your earlier point, the success of a moral argument may hinge not on formal logic but on a sense of moral empathy. Moral empathy with other human beings is, I’d imagine, more likely than with animals (especially those deemed insufficiently fluffy). The further an argument departs from such things – which may not be entirely amenable to rational analysis – the more difficult persuasion may be.
I don’t think I was saying any more than that.
Cambias,
Things sent to me in confidence remain in confidence. But maybe Ed will oblige you with a copy.
David,
If your claim is that good argument does not affect changes in moral understanding then we are, indeed, talking at cross purposes. I was under the impression that you were claiming that arguments against slavery and racism were more compelling than those against speciesism.
Your claim about how changes in understanding are arrived at is of course an empirical and non-moral point. For my part, I was under the impression that changes to the status quo were often effected by good argument.
John Stuart Mill’s influential essay on “The Subjection of Women” and Thomas Paine’s “The Right’s of Man” ware precisely example of that. Don’t you agree?
David,
Oh, sorry, I thought you were referring to my piece. (But by, “not for public consumption”, I meant I hadn’t originally intended to give it out for this purpose. I’m very happy for you to comment on the specifics, should you feel like it. Of course I don’t demand you read it. But you did ask for it!)
I had thought you were saying “anti-speciesist” arguments are not valid/sound. I see now you’re actually saying whether they are or not, they won’t efficiently change people’s attitudes, like more demagogic methods will. Well perhaps. But I guess that, as Jim just said above, is another argument.
Cambias:
You’d love to “get a crack at it”? It’s not a piñata. Anyway, thoughtful input is always good!
http://twentysixh.files.wordpress.com/2009/12/eb_amc.pdf
It falsifies the strong “specisist” view (C in the paper) and then moves to a strong “anti-specisist” conclusion – one that would, at the very least, entail vegetarianism for relatively affluent people.
It’s probably just as well Mukherjee doesn’t eat meat. Can you imagine the angst that would ensue on trying to find the right tomato sauce to accompany his burger?
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/dec/29/whole-foods-supermarkets
No “rational, intellectual or moral arguments to be made for carnivorousness.”?
How about at a pinch you can eat animals to keep from dying of starvation …and we are omnivores that come with canine teeth?
However – the absoutely irrefutable argument is the bacon sandwich.. mmmmm
Jim,
“If your claim is that good argument does not affect changes in moral understanding…”
I didn’t say that. And Mill and Paine are good examples of what is possible. I just suggested that in terms of the general population moral worldviews aren’t necessarily arrived at by technical discussion or formal analysis.
“I was under the impression that you were claiming that arguments against slavery and racism were more compelling than those against speciesism.”
Yes, I’d say they are, in part because of the above. Wouldn’t you?
Simply put, I’m not at all sure that morality can successfully be reduced to logical analysis (or extended to the degree that analysis can be). I don’t think that’s what most often drives morality in the sense of the various preferences people have and how they actually behave, or are willing to behave. A great deal of practical morality seems instinctive, unconscious or arrived at by a kind of social osmosis. Reciprocation is perhaps the most obvious consideration, and reciprocal feelings and expectations with other humans – even unfamiliar ones – are, I think, more likely than with unfamiliar animals. A sense of commonality with a random cow is harder to envisage than a sense of commonality with a stranger at the bus queue. And I don’t expect any amount of rationalising to alter that distinction on a meaningful scale any time soon.
There’s also something to be said for appreciating the limits of moralising in general, and specifically what one might realistically (or defensibly) hope to do in terms of whether others perceive animals as potential foodstuff.
David,
Is it the case that the wrongness of racism, slavery and sexism are instinctive and arrived at unconsciously? I think history proves that precisely the opposite is true.
It was painstaking argument by people such as Mill, Paine and many others that led to revolutions in our moral worldview.
Need I remind you that no sense of “commonality” was once felt with some other races and women? Both were believed to be different kinds of beings and, as a consequence, not deserving of the same kind of moral consideration as extended to white males.
The arguments that secured their rights were arguments similar to marginal cases arguments. It seems to me that, despite your lip service, you don’t know what these are.
Franklin said:
“My rationale for being a vegetarian is mostly emotional. I’m a mammal, I have mammals as pets, and I don’t like the idea of eating mammals.”
Franklin, a few questions:
1. What kind of mammals do you keep?
2. What kind of food do you give them?
3. Would you keep mammals like calves, pigs or lambs as your pets?
Jim, do you think meat eating could go the way of slavery based only on moral argument?
Karen,
If the question is: Do I think it possible that a large proportion of affluent people would stop eating meat because of good moral argument
The clearly yes; it is possible.
Jim, That’s not what I asked. I don’t just mean affluent people or people interested in politics and philosophy. I mean globally-to the extent slavery is taboo.
Karen, it would not be possible for meat eating to go the way of slavery based on moral argument alone. And here’s why: The moral argument applies only to those who can live heathily without meat in their diet (that is a part of the argument). Most of the world cannot do this, so without a change in their circumstances the global change you are talking about is not gonna happen. So Jim’s answer is right – it is possible for the relevant universe of people to be persuaded that eating meat is a bad thing.
Karen,
The moral vegetarian is only committed to the belief that eating meat is wrong for affluent people, i.e. those who can live healthily without it.
However, I am not capable of making grandiose empirical predictions concerning future events.
Simplius, I have three cats and a dog. We feed them Innova products, which are hardly vegetarian, of course, but largely consist of turkey, chicken, and fish. I’m led to understand that dogs and cats can be fed vegetarian diets but it seems preposterous to do so.
I haven’t spent enough time around farm animals to know whether I’d keep them as pets, with one exception: my wife once worked in a hippotherapy center, and I learned that keeping horses is a gigantic nuisance.
I’m sure Ed’s paper is good and sound, but if anyone else glanced over it and had a ‘Bertie Wooster’ moment I’d recommend this as a softer introduction to the topic:
http://www.michaelpollan.com/article.php?id=55
I’ve got a question for Ed, if he’s still around..
I have only read as far as the first page of your paper because I became unclear as to whether or not we have a common perception of reality. Forgive me if this parses out more clearly later, but you state:
M1. If all humans and no animals warrant direct consideration (C), then there must exist at least one property that satisfies all of the following (P):
a. Found in all humans.
b. Found in no animals.
c. Morally relevant5.
You seem to imply a universe which has at its base a binary 1/0 on/off state. Am I perceiving this correctly, or do I misunderstand? I need to know before I invest further…
Why do so many vegetarians assume plants are somehow… I dunno, less alive… less sentient… less worthy? Why the arbitrary line between animal and plant?
“I’m led to understand that dogs and cats can be fed vegetarian diets..”
Dogs, yes (though they need supplements). Cats, very much no.
“There’s also something to be said for appreciating the limits of moralising in general, and specifically what one might realistically (or defensibly) hope to do in terms of whether others perceive animals as potential foodstuff.”
Or ‘Don’t Tread On Me’.
“Or ‘Don’t Tread On Me’.”
Well, preferring livestock to be treated well prior to a swift dispatch seems perfectly reasonable to me, in much the same way that people who kick dogs aren’t generally looked on fondly. There are issues of cost, of course, but as a general preference it’s hardly weird or objectionable. But decrying meat eating as wicked or akin to racism is, methinks, a tad too far. And I’ve learned to be a little sceptical when faced with the psychodramas of “activists” and their coercive urges. Quite often there’s a whiff of something unpleasant.
Stevieray,
Because we have no good evidence that plants are sentient. Everything that we currently know about biology, comparative physiology and homology forces us to conclude that relatively complex brains cause sentience. Plants do not have these.
There is no arbitrary line drawn between plants and animals; quite the opposite.
David,
“Well, preferring livestock to be treated well prior to a swift dispatch seems perfectly reasonable to me, in much the same way that people who kick dogs aren’t generally looked on fondly.”
May I ask what exactly is reasonable about it? What is wrong with treating livestock badly – and could you please explain what constitutes treating it badly — or kicking dogs for no good reason?
Jim,
“May I ask what exactly is reasonable about it?”
Reasonable, taken literally, is perhaps the wrong word. It’s more that the preference for livestock being treated well – i.e. allowed to indulge in characteristic behaviour – roaming, sniffing, grooming, whatever – seems to sit more comfortably, more intuitively, with (for instance) a dislike of people who kick dogs. Whereas the abandonment of meat eating seems more intuitively distant from a dislike of people who kick dogs. As I said earlier, a great deal of moral perception, or moral reaction, isn’t particularly analytical. Perhaps it ought to be, but there we are.
Julia,
Thank you for the Guardian-piece. It’s amazing how much of their own virtue people are projecting onto their favorite vendors, and how far down those vendors topple from their pedestals when they can’t live up to the expectations.
”
For us, a place like Whole Foods should be an important way station between industrial food and something better. Mackey seems to understand that, but his blind exaltation of the individual misses some pretty important caveats.
Individuals live in a social setting, turning over some tasks so that they can specialise in others. I don’t want to perform my own surgery or maintain my own roads.
And I don’t want to come home from the grocery store with unhealthy food only to be told it’s my own damn fault.
Especially if I bought it at Whole Foods.
”
-S
David,
Ah so this is an issue of preference rather than anything else. I prefer boiled sweets and animal rights and you prefer sherbet and no animal rights.
Can I take you then as claiming that an animal cannot be wronged? A sentient non-human creature can be caused any amount of pain and suffering for any reason, including our pleasure, without anything morally wrong – and by definition something that should be stopped or punished – occurring. If someone wishes to perform such acts it is simply an issue of taste, and as we all know: De gustibus non est disputandum.
KRW/WTP,
I don’t fully understand your question. As far as I could tell you could mean either or both of the following:
1. Not all properties will be either satisfy all three of those conditions (A and B and C) or satisfy none of them. Many properties will be, say, A and B but not C, or B and C but not A, or just C, and so on.
2. There are gradations of the ways in which properties satisfy those conditions. Many properties will be in a few humans, in many animals, or in almost all humans and animals, while some will be somewhat morally relevant or only slightly morally relevant, etc.
Either way, I agree with those points and recognising both should not affect my argument. But if you meant something different entirely, my apologies. Please clarify your question and I’ll endeavour to address it.
David,
It’s rather disingenuous to imply moral vegetarians consider “speciesism” (and thus meat eating) morally equivalent to racism (or sexism). The two are, however, the same breed of prejudice. Perhaps that unpleasant smell is your own innuendo.
Jim,
“I prefer boiled sweets and animal rights and you prefer sherbet and no animal rights.”
You seem determined to take me as saying more than I am, and as being in favour of more than I am. I’m not advocating any particular attitude towards animals. I’m speculating as to how other people may regard their interaction with them. Personally, I’m not inclined to mistreat animals. I have better things to do and sadism isn’t my bag. But I don’t have a detailed moral blueprint for how the world as a whole should behave with regard to livestock. The subject of how others behave in this regard doesn’t prey upon my mind.
David,
In retrospect, perhaps my last came across as prickly. Apologies if so. Of course, the Guardian is full of snivelling, smug twats. This blog does an admirable job of informing us of them. But, my point is, the Guardian is not the guardian of moral arguments for vegetarianism.
David,
Can a sentient non-human animal be wronged or not? It’s a very simple question; yes or no will do.
Ed,
I wasn’t attempting to assign these views to every moral vegetarian, let alone anyone here. I was thinking of the Pollan piece about Peter Singer, linked above, in which a future is imagined where meat eating is regarded as “barbarity” and “speciesism” is “as indefensible as racism.” Hence my comments.
Jim,
A sentient non-human animal could certainly be treated in ways that would offend me.
David,
I agree. And, in your opinion, should the offenders be forced to desist from treating animals in such a way?
Jim,
That rather depends on the particulars. Offending my sensibilities isn’t in itself a crime. Again, while my own interactions with animals are generally benign, even indulgent, I don’t have a detailed moral blueprint for the treatment of livestock or human/animal interaction in general. Nor do I feel obliged to.
David,
Just on your last point, I take it that the argument from marginal cases gives the burden of proof to those who wish to treat animals differently from humans, when there are no other relevant differences, except species. I would think that this gives you an obligation to have a moral defence of treating them in such different ways (i.e. killing them for food).
David,
I apologise for my constant questions. I hope you understand that I am trying to understand your particularly nuanced position on this matter. I am having some difficulty with it.
Could you please explain the “particulars” on which it depends?
In competing for a scholarship by submitted essay I once took the position that animal ‘rights’, in essence, consist of the right to be either eaten or worn by humans. A gross oversimplification of course but in the real world these only seem to be arguments that occupy those parts of the world that have, frankly, become far too comfortable in themselves and is probably a sign of socio-sclerosis (made that word up but you’ll get the drift).Any human civilisation only ever occupies a given time in history with the current one evidently containing within it the seeds of it’s own downfall and I suspect also of those values that seem to cause such moral angst.
We just happen to occupy the top of the food chain at the moment with no guarantee this will always be the case.
No, this is not an argument for wanton cruelty.
Andrew, what is it an argument for?
Is that to say that one cannot eat meat or wear leather (as I personally do) without being guilty of animal cruelty?
Sorry Andrew, I’m confused. Is what to say that?
To clarify, I was just asking what it was that you were arguing for. I didn’t intend to imply anything else.
Tom & Jim,
“I would think that this gives you an obligation…”
You seem to want others – me, at least – to be as fascinated by animal welfare, and a certain moral framing of it, as you appear to be. It’s almost as if people who don’t share your interests should answer for themselves.
“I am trying to understand your particularly nuanced position…”
I don’t see my position as particularly nuanced or innovative. I just don’t feel any great urge to alter the moral worldview and priorities of random strangers, in this regard or more generally. Broadly speaking, I don’t feel it’s my business, provided the dog stays off my lawn. I realise it’s not a very exciting position, such as it is, to state.
I’ve things to do elsewhere, sadly, so I’ll have to bow out for now and leave you with some music. But thanks for some interesting discussion; I hope you’ll drop by again. (Likewise Ed.)
http://www.ignatz.plus.com/kingswingers.mp3
I truly wasn’t aware of actually arguing ‘for’ or ‘against’ anything but more trying to give a view on where we are as a species ourselves.
But as a question formally put; Can one eat meat and wear leather and not be guilty of cruelty to another species?
Andrew,
Ok thanks, just wanted to be clear where you were going with that. In response to your question, I think that one can do those things without being guilty of cruelty. For example, those who have no choice in the matter (see above).
I do have a choice in the matter – I eat meat and I wear leather and do not consider that as behaviour carrying any moral implications at all.
When a pig can ask me if I ought to reconsider, then I will reconsider. Until then – I will contentedly kill it and eat it.
And after reconsidering I may – may – kill it and eat it anyway.
Does “morality” exist anywhere outside a human skull?
I class arguments about the morality of eating meat on a level with arguments about how many angels can stand on the head of a pin. Both are equally valid, and in my view equally nonsensical.
David,
Thanks for the invite and the discussion. I don’t wish to imply that you, or anyone else, has an obligation to be fascinated by animal welfare. Nor that people should answer for themselves because they don’t share my interests. Only that they should answer for themselves when they are acting in prima facie morally problematic ways. I take the argument from marginal cases to give you that burden. The obligation is one of reason, not of interest.
So can I interpret that as meaning that exercising ‘choice’ where alternatives exist is, by definition, cruelty? Are the presence of ‘choice’ and moral ‘guilt’ mutually inclusive terms in your moral framework?
That would seem to condemn an awful lot of people to your particular moral judgement, in the first world in the main (and I’m not sure yet whether that is pertinent to your position). Again, ‘morals’ in actual fact do not exist in nature and are more an artifact of the nervous systems that we all possess. I suppose what I am also trying to say is that no ‘moral’ exists outside of a human skull.
But thank you for your conditional response.
David,
You wrote a piece criticising Neel Mukherjee for proclaiming on the issue without having addressed the “messy business” of the evidence and argument surrounding it:
“Ah. Not the place. Isn’t it wonderful when arguments can be won entirely in your own head, with none of that messy business with evidence, logic and stuff you hadn’t thought of?”
When engaged and presented with precisely what you were asking for, it turns out you were never really interested in the first place — that, essentially, you just don’t care what the truth is:
“You seem to want others – me, at least – to be as fascinated by animal welfare, and a certain moral framing of it, as you appear to be. It’s almost as if people who don’t share your interests should answer for themselves.”
I hope you understand why we might have been a little confused. Thank you for the discussion. I do very much enjoy your blog and have happy New Year!
I’m not eating meat today. Today I’m having fish.
Do the morality arguments apply to fish as well?
That you are having these arguments indicates you have far too comfortable a life, and are too far removed from nature – which does not have any morality whatsoever.
You’ll learn, when the great crash happens. Or you wont, in which case you will die of your morality.
“Died of morality related causes” will certanly make a change from “Died of tbacco related causes”.
Morgan,
You seem to imply that being able to conceive of morality is necessary for being considered morally, i.e. animals can’t conceive of morality so we don’t need to consider them in these terms. The argument from marginal cases points out that there are certain humans – the very young, the senile, and the severely mentally handicapped who also cannot conceive of morality. It’s demand is that if you think you have no duties to animals based on this lacking, you should either think there are no duties to these humans, or point out a relevant difference between these two groups.
Morgan,
Who will learn what?
Jim, David isn’t the one moralizing about it. Mukherjee is.
Karen,
Indeed.
Tom
So can I interpret that as meaning that exercising ‘choice’ where alternatives exist is, by definition, cruelty? Are the presence of ‘choice’ and moral ‘guilt’ mutually inclusive terms in your moral framework?
Guys,
This Morgan fellow: He’s fantasising about how much he’d enjoy busting a cap in a pig’s ass, and about how we’ll all die when we return to some survivalist gun-nut’s wet dream state of nature.
My advice is leave him well alone.
Andrew,
As you make clear, you mean that ‘morals’ do not exist in nature, where nature is taken to exclude humans. I think this is probably true. However, as we are discussing the actions of humans I don’t think it is particularly relevant, unless you want to built an argument that being a moral subject requires being a moral agent. In which case you face the argument from marginal cases again. See above.
The person who will not eat meat for moral reasons will learn that there is no morality in nature.
To eat (and live) you kill.
Maybe you wont learn – and so will die.
Had I been in the Argentinian aeroplane crash, I would have lived.
And no – morality is not something I ever consider. Perhaps I’ve been a psychopath for the past 57 years. OK, fine – but I’ve got away with it so far. And so far so good, as they say.
I was aged just four when I started killing and dressing food critturs (under the supervision of an uncle). That’s all meat is to me – something to eat.
If anyone doesn’t like that, is it me that has the problem.
I’ve been a soldier too and I can assure you, if someone is pointing a weapon in my general direction, I will kill without hesitation..
I have only one God and it is the same one Alcibiades had.
But then – I’m closer to nature than most people. Nature is not “live and let live” it’s “kill or be killed”. Creatures that don’t engage in this behaviour are ruminants – which is just another word for prey.
You may be appalled by my attitude – but if that is the case, who has the problem?
Simon: “It’s amazing how much of their own virtue people are projecting onto their favorite vendors, and how far down those vendors topple from their pedestals when they can’t live up to the expectations.”
I’m not sure in what respect WholeFoods is not ‘living up to expectations’, though. I’m assuming that that isn’t the only brand of ketchup they sell.
“…I don’t want to come home from the grocery store with unhealthy food only to be told it’s my own damn fault.
Especially if I bought it at Whole Foods.”
But they print the ingredients on the label. That’s how the article writer knew it contained the dreaded corn syrup…
Morgan,
At the risk of humouring your bloodlust: I would have no problem eating meat (even human meat) if my life depended on it. I’d also be perfectly happy to kill in a just war – like Afghan or Iraq. If you’d actually bothered to read my paper (linked above) you’d see that being a moral vegetarian in no way precludes those things.
Now can you just calm the fuck down? You sound mental.
Andrew,
“So can I interpret that as meaning that exercising ‘choice’ where alternatives exist is, by definition, cruelty? Are the presence of ‘choice’ and moral ‘guilt’ mutually inclusive terms in your moral framework?”
I didn’t respond to this part of your earlier post because I’m afraid I don’t know you mean here.