A Carnivore’s Shame
Bearing in mind the recent seasonal gorging, here’s another Classic Sentence from the Guardian. This time courtesy of Neel Mukherjee and his deep ruminations on vegetarianism.
It slowly dawned on me that there were no rational, intellectual or moral arguments to be made for carnivorousness.
Heavens, he’s bold. There simply isn’t a good reason to partake of the flesh. None whatsoever. I do hope there’s a devastating argument to support such a claim.
The meat-eaters had always already lost. This is not the place to rehearse all those arguments.
Ah. Not the place. Isn’t it wonderful when arguments can be won entirely in your own head, with none of that messy business with evidence, logic and stuff you hadn’t thought of? Mr Mukherjee does, however, indulge us with one attempt at reasoning:
Far more convincing for me than all kinds of shocking exposés of the meat industry and the way a piece of steak makes it way on to our plates… was the unimpeachable moral argument against speciesism: because we are the most powerful animals in the animal kingdom, because all animals are at our mercy and we can choose to do whatever we want with them, it is our moral duty not to decimate, factory farm and eat them. It is an argument of such majesty and generosity that its force is almost emotional.
Note the invention of an entirely new prejudice for those so inclined to feel guilty about – speciesism. Note too the sly conflation of meat eating with factory farming and decimation. This “unimpeachable moral argument” could of course be expressed a little less tendentiously,
Because we can eat animals it’s our duty not to.
But then – amazingly – it loses much of its persuasive force. To say nothing of its majesty.
Yes, it’s easy to mock, but I suspect there’s a serious purpose to outpourings of this kind. It just isn’t the one being affected by the writer and much of his readership. Clearly, the object isn’t to test the moral premise of vegetarianism:
This is not the place to rehearse all those arguments.
Indeed. This is a place for something else – something that for many Guardianistas is much more important. It’s a chance to signal attitudes that are ostentatious, self-involved and most likely dishonest: “Watch me agonise over meat. Look at how concerned I am. See how I fret.” The point is to display The Passion of Neel Mukherjee as he wrestles with temptation:
I still haven’t been able to stop eating meat. In any restaurant, my eyes alight first, as if by an atavistic pull, on the meat dishes on the menu. In any dinner party I throw, I think of the non-vegetarian dish as central. I view this as a combination of weakness, greed and moral failure. Someone please help.
Again, note the key ingredients – gratuitous personal drama and pretentious guilt. This posturing nonsense is pretty much a Guardian staple. Readers may recall Cath Elliott being politically distressed by peanut butter residue, and note the similarities between her dietary drama and that of Mr Mukherjee. Perhaps such things are best understood as a kind of theatre for people who wish to agonise and be seen agonising, so as to indicate just how concerned and moral they are, if only to people who are equally conflicted and pretentious.
Karen,
If the question is: Do I think it possible that a large proportion of affluent people would stop eating meat because of good moral argument
The clearly yes; it is possible.
Jim, That’s not what I asked. I don’t just mean affluent people or people interested in politics and philosophy. I mean globally-to the extent slavery is taboo.
Karen, it would not be possible for meat eating to go the way of slavery based on moral argument alone. And here’s why: The moral argument applies only to those who can live heathily without meat in their diet (that is a part of the argument). Most of the world cannot do this, so without a change in their circumstances the global change you are talking about is not gonna happen. So Jim’s answer is right – it is possible for the relevant universe of people to be persuaded that eating meat is a bad thing.
Karen,
The moral vegetarian is only committed to the belief that eating meat is wrong for affluent people, i.e. those who can live healthily without it.
However, I am not capable of making grandiose empirical predictions concerning future events.
Simplius, I have three cats and a dog. We feed them Innova products, which are hardly vegetarian, of course, but largely consist of turkey, chicken, and fish. I’m led to understand that dogs and cats can be fed vegetarian diets but it seems preposterous to do so.
I haven’t spent enough time around farm animals to know whether I’d keep them as pets, with one exception: my wife once worked in a hippotherapy center, and I learned that keeping horses is a gigantic nuisance.
I’m sure Ed’s paper is good and sound, but if anyone else glanced over it and had a ‘Bertie Wooster’ moment I’d recommend this as a softer introduction to the topic:
http://www.michaelpollan.com/article.php?id=55
I’ve got a question for Ed, if he’s still around..
I have only read as far as the first page of your paper because I became unclear as to whether or not we have a common perception of reality. Forgive me if this parses out more clearly later, but you state:
M1. If all humans and no animals warrant direct consideration (C), then there must exist at least one property that satisfies all of the following (P):
a. Found in all humans.
b. Found in no animals.
c. Morally relevant5.
You seem to imply a universe which has at its base a binary 1/0 on/off state. Am I perceiving this correctly, or do I misunderstand? I need to know before I invest further…
Why do so many vegetarians assume plants are somehow… I dunno, less alive… less sentient… less worthy? Why the arbitrary line between animal and plant?
“I’m led to understand that dogs and cats can be fed vegetarian diets..”
Dogs, yes (though they need supplements). Cats, very much no.
“There’s also something to be said for appreciating the limits of moralising in general, and specifically what one might realistically (or defensibly) hope to do in terms of whether others perceive animals as potential foodstuff.”
Or ‘Don’t Tread On Me’.
“Or ‘Don’t Tread On Me’.”
Well, preferring livestock to be treated well prior to a swift dispatch seems perfectly reasonable to me, in much the same way that people who kick dogs aren’t generally looked on fondly. There are issues of cost, of course, but as a general preference it’s hardly weird or objectionable. But decrying meat eating as wicked or akin to racism is, methinks, a tad too far. And I’ve learned to be a little sceptical when faced with the psychodramas of “activists” and their coercive urges. Quite often there’s a whiff of something unpleasant.
Stevieray,
Because we have no good evidence that plants are sentient. Everything that we currently know about biology, comparative physiology and homology forces us to conclude that relatively complex brains cause sentience. Plants do not have these.
There is no arbitrary line drawn between plants and animals; quite the opposite.
David,
“Well, preferring livestock to be treated well prior to a swift dispatch seems perfectly reasonable to me, in much the same way that people who kick dogs aren’t generally looked on fondly.”
May I ask what exactly is reasonable about it? What is wrong with treating livestock badly – and could you please explain what constitutes treating it badly — or kicking dogs for no good reason?
Jim,
“May I ask what exactly is reasonable about it?”
Reasonable, taken literally, is perhaps the wrong word. It’s more that the preference for livestock being treated well – i.e. allowed to indulge in characteristic behaviour – roaming, sniffing, grooming, whatever – seems to sit more comfortably, more intuitively, with (for instance) a dislike of people who kick dogs. Whereas the abandonment of meat eating seems more intuitively distant from a dislike of people who kick dogs. As I said earlier, a great deal of moral perception, or moral reaction, isn’t particularly analytical. Perhaps it ought to be, but there we are.
Julia,
Thank you for the Guardian-piece. It’s amazing how much of their own virtue people are projecting onto their favorite vendors, and how far down those vendors topple from their pedestals when they can’t live up to the expectations.
”
For us, a place like Whole Foods should be an important way station between industrial food and something better. Mackey seems to understand that, but his blind exaltation of the individual misses some pretty important caveats.
Individuals live in a social setting, turning over some tasks so that they can specialise in others. I don’t want to perform my own surgery or maintain my own roads.
And I don’t want to come home from the grocery store with unhealthy food only to be told it’s my own damn fault.
Especially if I bought it at Whole Foods.
”
-S
David,
Ah so this is an issue of preference rather than anything else. I prefer boiled sweets and animal rights and you prefer sherbet and no animal rights.
Can I take you then as claiming that an animal cannot be wronged? A sentient non-human creature can be caused any amount of pain and suffering for any reason, including our pleasure, without anything morally wrong – and by definition something that should be stopped or punished – occurring. If someone wishes to perform such acts it is simply an issue of taste, and as we all know: De gustibus non est disputandum.
KRW/WTP,
I don’t fully understand your question. As far as I could tell you could mean either or both of the following:
1. Not all properties will be either satisfy all three of those conditions (A and B and C) or satisfy none of them. Many properties will be, say, A and B but not C, or B and C but not A, or just C, and so on.
2. There are gradations of the ways in which properties satisfy those conditions. Many properties will be in a few humans, in many animals, or in almost all humans and animals, while some will be somewhat morally relevant or only slightly morally relevant, etc.
Either way, I agree with those points and recognising both should not affect my argument. But if you meant something different entirely, my apologies. Please clarify your question and I’ll endeavour to address it.
David,
It’s rather disingenuous to imply moral vegetarians consider “speciesism” (and thus meat eating) morally equivalent to racism (or sexism). The two are, however, the same breed of prejudice. Perhaps that unpleasant smell is your own innuendo.
Jim,
“I prefer boiled sweets and animal rights and you prefer sherbet and no animal rights.”
You seem determined to take me as saying more than I am, and as being in favour of more than I am. I’m not advocating any particular attitude towards animals. I’m speculating as to how other people may regard their interaction with them. Personally, I’m not inclined to mistreat animals. I have better things to do and sadism isn’t my bag. But I don’t have a detailed moral blueprint for how the world as a whole should behave with regard to livestock. The subject of how others behave in this regard doesn’t prey upon my mind.
David,
In retrospect, perhaps my last came across as prickly. Apologies if so. Of course, the Guardian is full of snivelling, smug twats. This blog does an admirable job of informing us of them. But, my point is, the Guardian is not the guardian of moral arguments for vegetarianism.
David,
Can a sentient non-human animal be wronged or not? It’s a very simple question; yes or no will do.
Ed,
I wasn’t attempting to assign these views to every moral vegetarian, let alone anyone here. I was thinking of the Pollan piece about Peter Singer, linked above, in which a future is imagined where meat eating is regarded as “barbarity” and “speciesism” is “as indefensible as racism.” Hence my comments.
Jim,
A sentient non-human animal could certainly be treated in ways that would offend me.
David,
I agree. And, in your opinion, should the offenders be forced to desist from treating animals in such a way?
Jim,
That rather depends on the particulars. Offending my sensibilities isn’t in itself a crime. Again, while my own interactions with animals are generally benign, even indulgent, I don’t have a detailed moral blueprint for the treatment of livestock or human/animal interaction in general. Nor do I feel obliged to.
David,
Just on your last point, I take it that the argument from marginal cases gives the burden of proof to those who wish to treat animals differently from humans, when there are no other relevant differences, except species. I would think that this gives you an obligation to have a moral defence of treating them in such different ways (i.e. killing them for food).
David,
I apologise for my constant questions. I hope you understand that I am trying to understand your particularly nuanced position on this matter. I am having some difficulty with it.
Could you please explain the “particulars” on which it depends?
In competing for a scholarship by submitted essay I once took the position that animal ‘rights’, in essence, consist of the right to be either eaten or worn by humans. A gross oversimplification of course but in the real world these only seem to be arguments that occupy those parts of the world that have, frankly, become far too comfortable in themselves and is probably a sign of socio-sclerosis (made that word up but you’ll get the drift).Any human civilisation only ever occupies a given time in history with the current one evidently containing within it the seeds of it’s own downfall and I suspect also of those values that seem to cause such moral angst.
We just happen to occupy the top of the food chain at the moment with no guarantee this will always be the case.
No, this is not an argument for wanton cruelty.
Andrew, what is it an argument for?
Is that to say that one cannot eat meat or wear leather (as I personally do) without being guilty of animal cruelty?
Sorry Andrew, I’m confused. Is what to say that?
To clarify, I was just asking what it was that you were arguing for. I didn’t intend to imply anything else.
Tom & Jim,
“I would think that this gives you an obligation…”
You seem to want others – me, at least – to be as fascinated by animal welfare, and a certain moral framing of it, as you appear to be. It’s almost as if people who don’t share your interests should answer for themselves.
“I am trying to understand your particularly nuanced position…”
I don’t see my position as particularly nuanced or innovative. I just don’t feel any great urge to alter the moral worldview and priorities of random strangers, in this regard or more generally. Broadly speaking, I don’t feel it’s my business, provided the dog stays off my lawn. I realise it’s not a very exciting position, such as it is, to state.
I’ve things to do elsewhere, sadly, so I’ll have to bow out for now and leave you with some music. But thanks for some interesting discussion; I hope you’ll drop by again. (Likewise Ed.)
http://www.ignatz.plus.com/kingswingers.mp3
I truly wasn’t aware of actually arguing ‘for’ or ‘against’ anything but more trying to give a view on where we are as a species ourselves.
But as a question formally put; Can one eat meat and wear leather and not be guilty of cruelty to another species?
Andrew,
Ok thanks, just wanted to be clear where you were going with that. In response to your question, I think that one can do those things without being guilty of cruelty. For example, those who have no choice in the matter (see above).
I do have a choice in the matter – I eat meat and I wear leather and do not consider that as behaviour carrying any moral implications at all.
When a pig can ask me if I ought to reconsider, then I will reconsider. Until then – I will contentedly kill it and eat it.
And after reconsidering I may – may – kill it and eat it anyway.
Does “morality” exist anywhere outside a human skull?
I class arguments about the morality of eating meat on a level with arguments about how many angels can stand on the head of a pin. Both are equally valid, and in my view equally nonsensical.
David,
Thanks for the invite and the discussion. I don’t wish to imply that you, or anyone else, has an obligation to be fascinated by animal welfare. Nor that people should answer for themselves because they don’t share my interests. Only that they should answer for themselves when they are acting in prima facie morally problematic ways. I take the argument from marginal cases to give you that burden. The obligation is one of reason, not of interest.
So can I interpret that as meaning that exercising ‘choice’ where alternatives exist is, by definition, cruelty? Are the presence of ‘choice’ and moral ‘guilt’ mutually inclusive terms in your moral framework?
That would seem to condemn an awful lot of people to your particular moral judgement, in the first world in the main (and I’m not sure yet whether that is pertinent to your position). Again, ‘morals’ in actual fact do not exist in nature and are more an artifact of the nervous systems that we all possess. I suppose what I am also trying to say is that no ‘moral’ exists outside of a human skull.
But thank you for your conditional response.
David,
You wrote a piece criticising Neel Mukherjee for proclaiming on the issue without having addressed the “messy business” of the evidence and argument surrounding it:
“Ah. Not the place. Isn’t it wonderful when arguments can be won entirely in your own head, with none of that messy business with evidence, logic and stuff you hadn’t thought of?”
When engaged and presented with precisely what you were asking for, it turns out you were never really interested in the first place — that, essentially, you just don’t care what the truth is:
“You seem to want others – me, at least – to be as fascinated by animal welfare, and a certain moral framing of it, as you appear to be. It’s almost as if people who don’t share your interests should answer for themselves.”
I hope you understand why we might have been a little confused. Thank you for the discussion. I do very much enjoy your blog and have happy New Year!
I’m not eating meat today. Today I’m having fish.
Do the morality arguments apply to fish as well?
That you are having these arguments indicates you have far too comfortable a life, and are too far removed from nature – which does not have any morality whatsoever.
You’ll learn, when the great crash happens. Or you wont, in which case you will die of your morality.
“Died of morality related causes” will certanly make a change from “Died of tbacco related causes”.
Morgan,
You seem to imply that being able to conceive of morality is necessary for being considered morally, i.e. animals can’t conceive of morality so we don’t need to consider them in these terms. The argument from marginal cases points out that there are certain humans – the very young, the senile, and the severely mentally handicapped who also cannot conceive of morality. It’s demand is that if you think you have no duties to animals based on this lacking, you should either think there are no duties to these humans, or point out a relevant difference between these two groups.
Morgan,
Who will learn what?
Jim, David isn’t the one moralizing about it. Mukherjee is.
Karen,
Indeed.
Tom
So can I interpret that as meaning that exercising ‘choice’ where alternatives exist is, by definition, cruelty? Are the presence of ‘choice’ and moral ‘guilt’ mutually inclusive terms in your moral framework?
Guys,
This Morgan fellow: He’s fantasising about how much he’d enjoy busting a cap in a pig’s ass, and about how we’ll all die when we return to some survivalist gun-nut’s wet dream state of nature.
My advice is leave him well alone.
Andrew,
As you make clear, you mean that ‘morals’ do not exist in nature, where nature is taken to exclude humans. I think this is probably true. However, as we are discussing the actions of humans I don’t think it is particularly relevant, unless you want to built an argument that being a moral subject requires being a moral agent. In which case you face the argument from marginal cases again. See above.
The person who will not eat meat for moral reasons will learn that there is no morality in nature.
To eat (and live) you kill.
Maybe you wont learn – and so will die.
Had I been in the Argentinian aeroplane crash, I would have lived.
And no – morality is not something I ever consider. Perhaps I’ve been a psychopath for the past 57 years. OK, fine – but I’ve got away with it so far. And so far so good, as they say.
I was aged just four when I started killing and dressing food critturs (under the supervision of an uncle). That’s all meat is to me – something to eat.
If anyone doesn’t like that, is it me that has the problem.
I’ve been a soldier too and I can assure you, if someone is pointing a weapon in my general direction, I will kill without hesitation..
I have only one God and it is the same one Alcibiades had.
But then – I’m closer to nature than most people. Nature is not “live and let live” it’s “kill or be killed”. Creatures that don’t engage in this behaviour are ruminants – which is just another word for prey.
You may be appalled by my attitude – but if that is the case, who has the problem?
Simon: “It’s amazing how much of their own virtue people are projecting onto their favorite vendors, and how far down those vendors topple from their pedestals when they can’t live up to the expectations.”
I’m not sure in what respect WholeFoods is not ‘living up to expectations’, though. I’m assuming that that isn’t the only brand of ketchup they sell.
“…I don’t want to come home from the grocery store with unhealthy food only to be told it’s my own damn fault.
Especially if I bought it at Whole Foods.”
But they print the ingredients on the label. That’s how the article writer knew it contained the dreaded corn syrup…
Morgan,
At the risk of humouring your bloodlust: I would have no problem eating meat (even human meat) if my life depended on it. I’d also be perfectly happy to kill in a just war – like Afghan or Iraq. If you’d actually bothered to read my paper (linked above) you’d see that being a moral vegetarian in no way precludes those things.
Now can you just calm the fuck down? You sound mental.
Andrew,
“So can I interpret that as meaning that exercising ‘choice’ where alternatives exist is, by definition, cruelty? Are the presence of ‘choice’ and moral ‘guilt’ mutually inclusive terms in your moral framework?”
I didn’t respond to this part of your earlier post because I’m afraid I don’t know you mean here.